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ABSTRACT
It is claimed that information system structure can affect the 
coordination, monitoring and controlling of organisational activities, 
and in turn reduce the costs involved. This paper aims to investigate 
how the information system structure of an organisation affects its 
demand and preference for monitoring costs in Malaysian business 
environment. About 867 questionnaires were distributed to public 
listed companies in Malaysia, however, only 235 questionnaires 
were completed and usable for the purpose of the study. Descriptive 
statistics and regression analysis were carried out to analyze the data. 
The findings indicate that companies using centralised information 
system structure have negative and significant relationship with total 
monitoring costs, this result may be explained by the fact that the 
agents’ self interest behaviour can be monitored by the centralised 
system. However the information system structure is not significant 
when the cost of directorship and auditing are compared. But when 
internal auditing and external auditing costs are compared, the result 
indicates that companies with centralised information system structure 
have significantly more internal auditing costs. This paper contributes 
to the literature relating to the relationship between information system 
structures and monitoring costs, especially in Malaysian business 
settings. 
Keywords: Information system structure, monitoring, auditing, 
internal audit, external audit, directorship, agency theory
INTRODUCTION
Global competition requires organisation to replace top-heavy management 
structures with lean, energetic and flexible organisation, and adopt an information 
system which can play a major role in this competitive environment (Vincent, 1990). 
* Corresponding Author: E-mail: mazlina05@gmail.com
Any remaining errors or omissions rest solely with the author(s) of this paper.
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It is also claimed that agents’ self interest behaviour can be monitored through 
information system, where organisation can invest in information system in order 
to control agent opportunism (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Porter & Miller (1985) claim that having an effective information system 
structure is a key mean to attain substantial and sustainable advantage within the 
competitive market place. In order to avoid causing organisational friction, an 
organisation should structure its organisational context in an appropriate manner. 
Questions arise as to what information system has to do with governance. Karake 
(1992) highlights that the major issue is how best to use information system for 
coordination, monitoring and controlling of the organisations activities in order to 
reduce cost. The demand for information that is timely, relevant, accurate, reliable 
and transparent is very crucial for the board to make sound decisions, set and 
execute strategies and oversee business performance. Agency theory also regards 
information as a commodity, where it can be purchased (Eisenhardt, 1989). It is 
claimed that the organisation can invest in information system in order to enhance 
accountability and control agent opportunism (Luo, 2005) as the information system 
inform the principals about what the agents are doing, therefore they cannot be 
deceived (Eisenhardt, 1989). This is supported by Ekanayake (2004) who claims 
that an inability to have complete governance procedures such as management 
control system as a mechanism to limit the opportunistic behaviour of agents can 
give rise to a lot of agency problems.
Previous studies examine various dimension of information structure in relation 
to other factors, such as how information system improve competitive advantage 
(Porter & Miller, 1985; Vincent, 1990), organisational consideration of information 
system (King, 1983), and  information technology performance (Karake, 1995). 
There are also studies examining the information system structure and corporate 
governance (Karake, 1992; Luo, 2005), but none of the studies investigate how 
information system influence the components of the monitoring /agency costs of 
an organization, and the preference between the components.
This study attempts to examine how the information system of an organisation 
affects the component of its monitoring/agency costs in Malaysian organizations. 
This study uses the direct measure of agency costs, which are the cost of monitoring 
the companies as recommended by Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
(FCCG, 2001), namely the cost of directorship, internal audit and external audit. 
Specifically, this study focuses on how the information system affects the demand 
and preferences of these three monitoring mechanisms as the proxy for agency 
costs in Malaysian organizations. 
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This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives a review of the relevant 
literature and proceeds with the development of hypotheses, and Section 3 provides a 
description of the methodology used for this study. Section 4 presents and discusses 
the results of the empirical analysis, and finally the last section concludes the study. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Information system encompasses of information that business creates and uses as 
well as the technology to process the information (Porter & Millar, 1985). Different 
organisations subscribe for various information system structures, ranging from 
highly centralised to highly decentralised (Karake, 1992). Centralised information 
structure is said to save money, involve uniform operation, and promote cost cutting 
and economics of scale (Vonsimson, 1990; King, 1983). Centralisation allows close 
monitoring and adjustment of work activities to better correspond with overall 
organisational operation (King, 1983). On the other hand, decentralisation can 
create problems if the decisions of the sub-departments are not in line with the 
overall objectives of the organisation at large and therefore more monitoring is 
needed. Thus, it is argued that an organisation with centralised information system 
structure can be better monitored, the activities can be tuned to suit the overall 
objectives of the organisation, less conflict and information asymmetries (as the 
information system is centralised), and less monitoring is needed. Consequently, 
it is hypothesised that: 
H1: An organisation which has a centralised information system 
structure has a lower total amount expended on monitoring from 
auditing and directorship.
Decentralisation of information system allows lower level managers discretion 
in choosing among options (King, 1983) and due to self interest motives exist in the 
organisation, it can create problems if the decisions of the sub-departments are not 
in line with the overall objectives of the organisation at large. This structure may 
provide obstacle for directors in obtaining information regarding the organisation 
as a whole, compared to centralised structures which allow directors to get 
timely, relevant, accurate, reliable and transparent information (Karake, 1992). A 
centralised structure is also said to promote efficiency (King, 1983).  In other words, 
a centralised structure facilitates the directors’ job to make sound decisions, set 
objectives, execute strategies and oversee business performance. It is argued that 
organisations with centralised information structure motivate the organisations to 
depend more on directors compared to the auditors as their monitoring mechanism 
because with the information supplied by the centralised information system, the 
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board can monitor the organisations efficiently, and less reliance on auditors. Hence, 
it is hypothesised that:
H2: An organisation which has a centralised information system 
structure has a relatively greater expenditure on monitoring from 
directors compared to auditing (internal and external).
In the event that auditing is used as a monitoring mechanism in an organisation 
with centralised information structure, the internal control and the accounting 
technologies of the systems are important and more relied upon by claimholders. 
The value of external auditors’ independence is lower here as the internal auditors 
are perceived as being able to understand and more familiar with the information 
system, its technologies and complexities better than the external auditors (Anderson 
et al., 1993). Furthermore, if the internal audit is carried out internally, they are the 
staff of the organisation and more familiar with its systems. Even though the service 
is outsourced, it is among the internal auditors’ responsibilities to review and ensure 
that all the internal control systems, including the information system and policies 
of the organisation are being carried out in order to achieve the objectives of the 
organisation. In other words, the internal auditors’ responsibilities in an organisation 
(regardless of whether it is in-house or outsourced) make them more familiar with 
the policies and systems that the organisation has compared to the external auditors. 
In fact, Anderson et al. (1993) claim that in this circumstance, external auditors can 
also rely on internal accounting control (including internal auditors) in conducting 
the external audit and produce cost savings to the organisation. Therefore it is 
argued that the organisation would depend more on the internal auditors rather 
than external auditors. Hence it is hypothesised that:
H3:  An organisation which has a centralised information system 
structure has a relatively greater expenditure on monitoring from 
internal auditing compared to external auditing.
METHODOLOGY
Data and Sample
Data for the study was collected using primary source. Questionnaires were 
distributed to all 867 companies (from Main and Second board as at 31 December 
2007) in the population. However, the companies classified under finance sector 
were excluded in this study because of their unique features and business activities, 
as well as differences in compliance and regulatory requirements (Yatim et al., 
2006). The response rate was 27%, with 235 usable samples used in the study. 
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Models and Variable Definition
There are three models to test the three hypotheses. And there are three dependent 
variables, one dependent variable for each model. 
The first model tests hypothesis 1 (H1):
MONITORING =	αi + b1ISStruc + b2SIZE + b3REVIND + b4COMPLEX 
+  b5GROWTH + b6CONTRASE + b7INDPROP 
+ b8RISK + b9LISTSTAT + εi  ........................ Model 1
Where the dependent variable is the monitoring costs of the companies listed in 
Bursa Malaysia. Directorship and auditing (internal and external) are specified 
as monitoring mechanisms in the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
(FCCG, 2001). This total Monitoring (MONITORING) is measured by the sum 
of organization investment in non-executive directors’ remunerations, internal 
auditors’ costs, and external auditors’ costs.
The second model test hypothesis 2 (H2):
DIRAUD =	αi + b1 ISStruc + b2SIZE + b3REVIND + b4COMPLEX 
+ b5GROWTH + b6CONTRASE + b7INDPROP + b8RISK 
+ b9LISTSTAT + εi ................................................ Model 2
Where the dependent variable is the ratio of total directors’ remuneration to 
total auditing.  This model test the hypothesis relating to the preference between 
directorship and auditing. 
The third model test hypothesis 3 (H3):
INT EXT =	αi + b1 ISStruc + b2SIZE + b3REVIND + b4COMPLEX 
+ b5GROWTH + b6CONTRASE + b7INDPROP + b8RISK 
+ b9LISTSTAT + εi ................................................ Model 3
Where the dependent variable is the ratio of the total internal audit costs to total 
external audit costs. This model test the hypothesis relating to the preference 
between internal auditing and external auditing.
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The independent variable in all models is the information system structure 
(ISStruc) adopted by the companies. The controlled variables included in this study 
are size, complexity, risk, sectors and listing status.
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS
Descriptive Statistics
Data was cleaned before the analysis was carried out. The data was also checked 
for reliability and validity. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach Alpha) was within 
the agreed upon lower limit of 0.8 (Ho, 2006, p. 240). The Cronbach Alpha of 
0.828 suggests that the items are reliable and internally consistent to represent the 
information system attribute of the organizations (ISSTRC). The value of Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin for the data is 0.656 which indicates that the factor analysis model is 
appropriate as the value is greater than 0.6 (Cyril De Run, 2008, p.76).
The results of non-response bias test indicate that there are no significant 
differences in the replies between early and late respondents, which act as proxy 
for respondents and non-respondents. This suggests that non-response bias would 
not be an issue in this study.
Table 1 Descriptive summary statistics
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
MONITORING 12.984 10.9491 16.8605 1.0005 0.864 0.922
DIRAUD 9.7291 0.1076 38.2952 7.4972 1.190 1.516
INTEXT 0.5959 0.0000 2.2210 0.4098 1.437 2.777
ISStruc 0.8000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3980 -1.544 0.386
SIZE 19.744 16.720 24.8991 1.4171 0.911 0.887
REVINV 0.3088 0.0019 0.8046 0.1945 0.329 -0.888
COMPLEX 2.4998 0.0000 6.0981 0.9091 0.232 1.430
GROWTH 1.0515 0 1 0.7092 5.424 42.856
CONTRASE 0.3300 0 1 0.4720 0.718 -1.497
INDPROP 0.5400 0 1 0.5000 -0.146 -1.996
RISK 0.2000 0 1 0.3980 1.544 0.386
LISTSTAT 0.7400 0 1 0.4370 -1.130 -0.731
Variable definition:
MONITOR = Total monitoring costs(ln); DIRAUD = Ratio of director costs to auditing costs; INTEXT 
= Ratio of internal audit costs to external audit costs (ln); ISSTRC = Information structure (Dummy); 
SIZE = Total assets(ln); RECINV = Ratio of inventories and receivables to total assets; COMPLEX 
=Number of subsidiaries(ln); GROWTH = Tobin’s Q; RISK = Current year loss(Dummy); LISTSTAT 
= Board listing (Dummy); CONSTRASE = Companies in consumer, trading and service sectors; 
INDPROP = Companies in industrial, constructions and property sectors.
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Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent and control 
variables.  The results of standard tests on skewness and kurtosis in Table 1 indicate 
that there is no problem with normality assumption1. Thus, these variables can 
reasonably be considered as normally distributed.
Table 2 presents pairwise correlation coefficient of all variables. The result 
indicates that there is no multicollinearity problem, as the correlations among the 
independent variables are below the threshold value of 0.8 (Gujarati, 2003, p. 359).
Regression Analysis
The data was analyzed using multiple regression analysis. Table 3 presents the 
results for all the three models. 
Column two of Table 3 presents the multiple regression analysis used to test the 
model 1. The adjusted R squared for the model is 0.745 and the F-value of 76.853 is 
significant (p <0.000). The result indicates that those companies having centralised 
information system have significant negative relationship with monitoring costs 
as predicted. Thus, hypotheses H1 is supported. The independent t-test run for 
this variable against the monitoring costs is also significant (at 10 percent level 
of significant). This result support the earlier notion that those companies having 
centralised information system are expected to have lower monitoring costs. This 
is due to the fact that agents self interest behaviour can be monitored though this 
information system (Eisenhardt, 1989) which is further argued to be able to better 
monitor the activities of the organisation and make sure that the activities of the 
subdivision/subsidiaries are in-lined with the overall objectives of the organisations. 
This result is consistent with the findings from earlier studies by King (1983) who 
claim that centralised information system allows close monitoring of activities and 
better correspond with the organisational overall objectives. 
However, information systems structure variable in Model 2 (column three of 
Table 3) is not significant, thus hypothesis H2 is not supported. The independent 
t-tests run for both variables against the ratio of directorship to auditing are also 
insignificant. In other words, while monitoring is important, the preference between 
directorship and auditing is less clear. A plausible explanation for this insignificant 
result may be due to the existence of some control measures in Malaysian listed 
firms. It is noted that, Malaysian firms have some control measures in their 
companies regardless of whether they are having a centralised or decentralised 
information system. Close to 84% of the sample companies have budgets, 
1 The data is said to be normal if the standard skewness is within  ±1.96 and standard kurtosis is between 
±3.0 (Mat Nor & Sulong, 2007; Abdul Rahman & Mohamed Ali, 2006; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).
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approximately 70% of the companies prepare variance reports and most of them 
(90.6%) have management meetings to solve companies’ problems. Having internal 
control measures (87%) and cost accounting measures (75.6%) also appear to be a 
norm in these companies. Overall, the centralised information system manages to 
cut costs and promote efficiency in the firms (as shown in the significant result in 
Model 1), but when directorship and auditing are compared, it is not significant. 
This may be due to the existences of these controls which also provide information 
to the top management of the companies in monitoring their companies and can 
also be used to check on the sales and profit figures of the companies, resulted in 
this insignificant result.
Table 3 Results of OLS estimation
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
CONSTANT 1.822***
(2.979)
47.317***
(5.601)
-1.519***
(-3.245)
ISStruc -0.145*
(-1.754)
-0.269
(-0.235)
0.141**
(2.234)
SIZE 0.538***
(16.383)
-1.938***
(-4.270)
0.112***
(4.45)
COMPLEX 0.253***
(5.758)
-0.503
 (-0.831)
-0.089***
(-2.643)
RECINV 0.585***
(3.026)
1.427
(0.534)
0.276*
(1867)
RISK -0.189**
(-2.121)
-3.342***
(-2.718)
-0.005
(-0.079)
GROWTH 0.103**
(2.197)
-0.418
(-0.643)
0.067*
(1.865)
LISTSTAT -0.207**
 (-2.358)
2.363**
 (1.945)
-0.074
(-1.101)
CONTRASE -0.014
(-0.121)
0.600
(0.387)
-0.058
(-0.679)
CONSTPROP -0.148
(-1.400)
1.580
(1.084)
-0.121
(-1.501)
R-squared
Adj R-squared
F-Statistics
P-value
0.755
0.745
76.853
0.000000
0.166
0.133
4.987
0.000000
0.143
0.109
4.184
0.000000
Notes:    *** significant at 1% level;   ** significant at 5% level ;    * significant at 10% level
(See variable definition in Table 1)
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Column four of Table 3 presents the result of Model 3. The results in this 
column indicate that companies with centralised information system would have 
higher monitoring costs in internal audit compared to external audit. This hypothesis 
variable is significant and at the expected direction, thus hypothesis H3 is supported. 
The independent t-test run for this variable against the ratio of internal audit costs 
to external audit costs is also significant. 
This significant result may be due to the fact that the focus of internal audit 
works includes dealing with the details and technicalities of information system 
in the organisation. Section 4.68 of the Code (FCCG, 2001) specifies that the 
main role of the internal audit function is to evaluate risk and monitor the internal 
control system, and should be in the position to assist the board in obtaining the 
assurance relating to the effectiveness of the internal control system. The internal 
auditors need to understand the established policies, procedures and statutory 
requirements (including those relating to information system) that the organisation 
needs to comply with, as among their responsibilities are to ensure that these 
procedures and policies are complied with, followed by systematic review of the 
internal control system, accounting and management information system and risk 
management system (Kah Yun and Haron, 2004). This is supported by Fadzil et al. 
(2005) who claim that internal auditors understand and appreciate the organisation 
business process, act as management consultant to reduce risks and help run an 
organisation more efficiently and effectively to increase shareholders’ value. In 
fact, under this circumstance, external auditors can also rely on internal accounting 
control (including internal auditors) in conducting the external audit and produce 
cost savings to the organisation (Anderson et al., 1993). 
CONCLUSION
The major purpose of this study is to investigate how the information system 
structure of an organisation affects its demand and preference for monitoring costs 
in Malaysian business environment. The results indicate that companies which 
has centralised information structure have significantly less monitoring costs 
compared to those companies adopting decentralised information system. This 
finding suggests that centralised information system helps the organisation to save 
money, promote cost cutting and encourage efficiency. However the information 
system structure is not significant when the cost of directorship and auditing are 
compared. But when internal auditing and external auditing costs are compared, 
the result indicates that companies with centralised information structure have 
significantly more internal auditing costs. This result may be due to the fact that 
taking care of the organisations’ internal control systems, including the information 
system are within the responsibilities of the internal auditors. 
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This study has its limitation which should be interpreted in a limited way, 
and this provides opportunities for further investigation in future research. This 
study is a cross sectional study, where it uses one year data only. This is due to 
the unavailability of certain data (such as details on information system adopted 
by the organizations and their internal audit costs) from secondary sources. This 
short period of study may not be representative of the way companies operate 
their businesses. Future research could extend the study to include more years of 
data, thus further investigation on the impact of the information system structure 
on the demand and preferences for monitoring mechanisms in the short and long-
terms can be analyzed. Future study can also investigate the relationship between 
monitoring costs and information system structure in Malaysian organizations by 
using a different research method. Interview sessions can be arranged with those 
involved in selecting and overseeing of the monitoring mechanisms and those 
involved in the decision relating to information system structure of the organizations. 
This study adds to the literature relating to the relationship between information 
system structures and monitoring costs, especially in Malaysian business settings. 
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